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THE CAB RANK RULE: A 
REAPPRAISAL OF THE DUTY TO 
ACCEPT CLIENTS 
Maree Quinlivan· 
Inevitably at some time in a lawyer's professwnal life they will be requested to act for a client 
or cause which they find distasteful. They may have to answer the question of whether they 
would assist a remorseless killer to escape conviction on the ground of a mere legal 
technicality, or whether to refuse to prepare legal instruments that would or assist 
industrialists in pollution, or perhaps to provide legal advice regarding the avoidance of 
obligations under family law legislation. Such ethical dilemmas focus upon the legal 
representation of distasteful causes or clients. This paper discusses the duty that a lawyer has 
as a 'legal professional' to undertake such representations. It considers the ideological 
foundation upon which this duty is built, and the consequences of the duty. It compares the 
English system, where the freedom to chose which clients to represent is denied, with the 
American system, where such freedom is honoured. From this comparison the American 
system is preferred, and reform of the New Zealand system is advocated . 
I INTRODUCTION 
A contradiction of legal practice is that lawyers as the facilitators and guardians of 
justice are often seen to aid in the generation of injustice. This is particularly so when the 
practitioner is seen to have represented a client in an extremely unpopular cause. The duty 
to provide legal representation to any client, if workload and expertise permit, is 
fundamental to the legal profession because representation is the very purpose of the legal 
role. The profession enjoys a monopoly over legal services.' In order for every citizen to 
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have access to these services the lawyer must, as representative, facilitate the exercise of the 
right to legal processes. Whilst this duty to represent is recognised as a fundamental 
obligation of the bar, the actual scope of this duty is more complex, for that which it 
demands of the practitioner is different according to jurisdiction. 
This paper will look at the obligation of representation as applied in the contrasting 
jurisdictions of the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of (USA). After considering 
what the professional requirements are, this paper will examine how these requirements 
reflect the professional ideals of public service and loyalty to the client, and whether the 
requirements resolve the three way tension between these two duties and the practitioner's 
desire to remain true to his or her own moral beliefs and values. 
The USA system is often characterised as honouring the legal professional's moral 
autonomy. This paper examines the ethical framework of the USA approach that enables 
this and reviews the factors that are provided to assist in the assessment of whether the 
refusal to represent is justified or unjustified. Finally the New Zealand system will be 
reviewed and the effectiveness of the cab rank rule will be considered. After assessing the 
merits or otherwise of the alternative systems this paper advocates reform. 
II THE DUTY OF REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
In the UK the formal requirements of the duty of representation are stated in the ethical 
code of the bar:2 
A barrister in independent practice is in general bound to accept any brief to appear before a 
court in the field in which he [or she] professes to practice, having regard to his [or her] 
experience and seniority, at the proper professional fee having regard to the length and 
difficulty of the case and to his [or her] availability. 
This obligation of representation has its roots in a tradition that far exceeds this 
statement. As Lord Pearce rightfully observed, this duty has survived many years, and is 
part of the ancient tradition of the bar: 3 
[A]s matters are, and have been for centuries, a barrister is bound to provide his [or her] 
services to a client who can pay a fee (or whose fees are paid by the public Legal Aid Fund) if 
the case is one either in the courts or in the advisory sphere in which a barrister normally 
practices. 
Code of Conduct for the Bar of England and Wales 4th ed (1989) paras 16.1, 13.4.1 (a) as cited in 
Ha/sbury's Laws of England (4 ed Butterworths, London, 1989) vol3(1), Barristers, para 457, p 365. 
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Colloquially, this obligation is referred to as the 'cab rank rule.'4 It is so named because 
of the analogy that is drawn between the professional, or more specifically, the barrister,5 
and the cab driver. It requires that the lawyer, like the cab driver, "takes whomever beckons 
to whatever destination may be commanded"6• Furthermore, the lawyer, like the cab driver 
"must act on a first come, first serve[d] basis."7 
An historical examination of the legal profession assists in explaining the rationale for 
this rule. In the early history of the bar attorneys were admitted directly by the judges of the 
court, and medieval statutes gave the court direct control over these officers. If requested by 
the court, the lawyer had an obligation to provide representation even when he (at that time 
only rren. could practice law) may not have desired to. The professional even had the 
obligation to provide free services if the court so requested.' In this way legal services were 
guaranteed to all citizens. As the structure of the courts and the profession evolved, so did 
the power of the court, yet the desire to enforce the obligation of ensuring access to legal 
services still remains. The very reason for the cab rank rule is the quest "to ensure that 
unpopular individuals and issues [are] properly represented."9 
In theory then, unless the specified exceptions apply, the cab rank rule obliges 
representation by the practitioner. Whether or not the rule achieves this goal is another 
matter, and an assessment of the effectiveness of the rule is examined in part IV. Primarily 
however, the cab rank rule will be assessed in terms of its relationship with the two ideals 
of professionalism: public service and loyalty to the client. A consideration of the three way 
tension of duty to these ideals and the personal moral autonomy of the lawyer will follow. 
A The Cab Rank Rule and the Ideals of Professionalism 
Professionalism brings with it both privileges and obligations. The professional enjoys 
advantages such as social prestige and above average income."' In return for powers and 
privileges society places demands upon the profession. These demands are the ideologies of 
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professionalism. They are both aspirational and prescriptive as they prescribe not only 
what the profession is, but further what it seeks and is meant to be. The demands of 
professionalism categorise neatly into two contrasting conceptions of 'service' and 'loyalty'. 
These will be considered separately. 
1 The duty of public service 
The moral ideal of public service11 is fundamental to professionalism. Generally the kind 
of services rendered by the professional are necessary services, relating to "physical health, 
liberty, religious salvation, or psychological well being.'m As the professional is seen to 
provide a service or resource needed by society the profession is attributed with a 'helping' 
nature and it is assigned the moral ideal of service for the public good.13 
This is certainly so for the legal professional which is expected to maintain and bring 
about legal order and justice. Specifically, and for the purposes of this paper this demands 
that the practitioner ensure access to the law. As the upholder and facilitator of the 
working of the law the lawyer is obliged to provide services to citizens so that they might be 
able to function within the legal system. Law is thus deerred as a public good, 14 as a 
'commodity' provided for the benefit of society. In being available to render services to 
individual clients the lawyer is seen as ultimately acting for the good of all. In so acting, the 
practitioner is seen to play his or her part in maintaining social order. Society's demand for 
the fulfilment of this role is considered not only just, but right: 15 
A society fails to respect the human dignity of those within its jurisdiction if it denies them a 
fair opportunity to raise questions about what is due to them under the law before properly 
constituted courts, and to defend themselves against claims upon themselves or charges 
against themselves ... 
The ideology of altruism also demands that the professional serve society by acting as 
the guardian of justice.16 The practitioner is therefore expected to shoulder the 
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responsibility of maintaining and sustaining justice and promoting good. Service to the 
public therefore means that the lawyer will practise and promote high standards of 
morality, good and integrity. The contradiction of legal service is that lawyers are often 
seen to fail in this task. Instead of being seekers and keepers of justice they are seen to 
"manipulate ... the legal system without any concern for right or wrong".17 
The cab rank rule clearly reflects the public service ideal. The obligation to provide 
legal representation to all in an unbiased 'first come, first served' basis reflects the 'helping 
nature', and access to and maintenance of public order conceptions that make up the ideal. 
Fundamentally the provision of legal services is deemed as a social good and as service to 
society. 
In summary, the ideology of service obliges the lawyer to serve society by providing, 
maintaining and sustaining justice. It confers upon the professional obligations of upholding 
legal order and facilitating access to legal processes and institutions within a conception of 
responsibility to others.18 Prima facie such expectations seem reasonable, clear and perhaps 
even attainable yet this is not necessarily so, for juxtaposed against this ethic of care is the 
individualistically founded ideology of loyalty to the client. This contradicts the service 
ideal. It places the professional in a position of tension of service to society and service to 
the individual. 
2 The duty of loyalty 
In contrast to the service ideal is that of loyalty to the client.19 Based upon principles of 
neutrality, in this view the practitioner is seen as an impartial participant, and as little 
more than a legal technician.20 She or he is regarded as neutral, detached and therefore 
unaccountable for that which she or he achieves: 21 
[The]lawyer must ... pursue the client's objectives, regardless of the lawyer's opinion of the 
client's character and reputation, and the moral merits of the client's objectives ... The lawyer 
need not consider, nor may he [or she] be held responsible for, the consequences of his [or her] 
17 Above n 7, 15. 
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professional activities as long as he [or she] stays within the law and acts in pursuit of the 
client's legitimate aims. 
The loyalty ideal also founds itself upon the principle of partisanship. "This principle 
prescribes that the lawyer work aggressively to advance his [or her] client's ends.'m The 
lawyer's sole allegiance is to the client/3 and therefore every 'legal move' is performed in 
order to maximise benefit to the client. The partisan role is a jealous one. It both permits and 
requires that the professional be prepared to do for the client that which she or he would 
not do for anyone else?4 It demands of the practitioner a "commit[ment] to the aggressive and 
single-minded pursuit of the client's objectives."25 
Both of these principles interact to facilitate and protect the client's autonomy. As the 
neutral and partisan practitioner the lawyer acts as the detached, objective agent zealously 
committed to furthering the interests of the client. In so acting the lawyer respects and 
sustains the freedom of the client to act as he or she wishes. This both enables and protects 
client autonomy. 
The cab rank rule is reflective of the ideal of loyalty to the client in that it builds upon 
elements of individual access and autonomy. For whilst the provision of legal services is 
deemed as a social good, it is also seen as honouring individual rights in promoting with 
zeal the maintenance and defence of the client's rights. Thus the legal system, including the 
lawyer, is seen as the defender and promoter of rights. As a result of this, the idea that a 
legal system would purport to grant legal rights in the quest of justice, but fail to ensure the 
provision of a legal 'agent', "without whose assistance [such] rights cannot be effectively 
claimed", is viewed as an unacceptable contradiction.26 Even though a cause or action is 
objectionable, it is reasoned that it is equally (if not more) objectionable to deny the right of 
the individual to be represented in respect of that cause or action. 
Accordingly the legal professional is deemed to be not only permitted, but in fact, 
required, to act on behalf of any client who calls upon his or her services. As with the ideal 
of service to the public, the ideal of service to the client attaches great importance to the 
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obligation of representation, and in meeting this need the practitioner is hailed as laudable: 
"The lawyer is a good person in that he [or she] provides access to the law :in providing 
such access without moral screening he [or she] serves the moral values of individual 
autonomy and equality ... " 27 
Consequently, merely by providing representation, the lawyer is seen to do an act of 
professional merit. Competence is therefore assessed according to the "level of care given the 
client"28 and the excellence with which the job is done. It is the lawyer's ability to assist the 
client to exercise autonomy that matters, not the cause or action that is being pursued, nor 
"the quality of the client"29 to whom assistance is being given: "a good lawyer is no worse a 
lawyer for representing clients who are legally culpable or for defending clients who are 
morally but not legally guilty of performing any wrong. Like the good teacher, and the good 
advertiser, the good lawyer must do the best he or she can for whatever client he or she 
has".30 
Prima facie then, the two ideals and the duty of representation concur. Providing access 
to the processes of law is seen as honouring individual autonomy and equality. It is deemed 
as serving both the public good and the interests of the individual, and therefore the two 
ideals are seen to be united in their demand for the duty. However, on a deeper level, this 
compatibility is not so clear. For, as part of the ideal of public service, society demands not 
only excellence of professional skills and practice, but also high standards of integrity, 
responsibility and moral good. Whilst it is clear that professional competence is important, 
it is not to be presumed that society deems it of such importance as to justify its promotion at 
the expense of high standards of morality. Furthermore, whilst it is clear that competence is 
expected, it is not so clear that the detachment and non-accountability doctrines of 
professionalism that attach to this conception of competence, are so readily accepted. 
B The Cab Rank Rule and the Tensions Betwef!t Accountability and Autonomy 
On one hand the cab rank rule is commended on its ability to serve the public good and 
honour individual autonomy. Yet in opposition to this some argue that it fails in these 
aspects and denies the lawyer autonomy. Those who oppose the rule advocate that in failing 
to respect autonomy, the rule fails society. Instead of promoting 'good' it is seen to sanction 
unaccountability and irresponsibility for moral harm. 
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1 The rule and its failure to maintain accountability 
The principle of detachment or 'non-accountability' says that a lawyer is responsible 
neither for the means used, nor the ends achieved in a legal representation.31 The lawyer's 
role is described as that of "an agent,'m and as similar to that of a soldier.33 Responsibility 
is therefore evaded by the justification that the lawyer in fulfilling his or her role is only 
acting as a professional is obliged to act. Such claims do not go without challenge and 
Wasserstrom's comments34 are typical of the rejection that such views receive: 35 
There is, I think something quite seductive about being able to turn aside ... many ostensibly 
difficult moral dilemmas and decisions with the reply : but that is not my concern; my job as a 
lawyer is not to judge the rights and wrong of the client or cause, it is to defend as best I can 
my client's interest. 
The battle metaphor is also dismissed, with the reminder that professional soldiers are 
not always able to justify their actions and escape moral accountability by pleading mere 
conformity with professional constraints: 36 
It is morally wrong to fight in an unjust cause, ... and it is wrong to employ impermissible means 
in fighting ... Even though the role is, in general, morally justifiable, it does not follow that a 
professional soldier is justified in doing everything he or she may be called upon as a 
professional to do. 
Furthermore, critics object to the idea that lawyers share an immunity that is 
unavailable to others. In arguing that "all persons are morally accountable for their 
behaviour,"37 it is reasoned that practitioners should be no more privileged than any other. 
In short, it is contended that the professional should be as morally accountable as any other 
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accessory to the wrong. Finally it is argued that this escapism into role founds itself upon a 
theoretical perception of the client/lawyer relationship that does not accurately reflect 
reality. Due to the advisory and dependency elements of the legal role the legal professional 
is seen as acting beyond that of an 'agency' role. 38 
... the principle of detachment ... rests on an assumption that the lawyer's client directs the 
lawyer to take steps and to initiate moves in the client's behalf ... Yet lawyers know that 
representations often do not work that way. Often lawyers either assume that clients wish to 
press every possible legal advantage or urge clients to do so. Clients ... are only doing what their 
wise cow1sellor has recommended. 
This unaccountability and failure to take responsibility for the moral consequences of 
one's actions is seen as an ironic failure to serve the public good, and therefore as a failure 
of the profession. 
2 The rule and its failure to honour autonomy 
The principle of autonomy attributes value to the role of the lawyer because it provides 
assistance to individual citizens to be able to exercise their fundamental rights. The 
achievement of this altruistic good requires sacrifice. Therefore in a lofty idealism of 
heroism the professional is seen to be willing to "devote [him or herself] to the interests of 
another at the peril of"3" him or herself. 
In order to promote the client's autonomy the lawyer is required to fetter his or her own 
autonomy, and to "sublirninate moral repulsion to the requirements of the service function of 
providing legal assistance".40 As a result, the client's autonomy is privileged at the sacrifice 
of the lawyer's, and rhetorically the question is asked: "Where in the amoral role is there a 
place for the lawyer's moral autonomy?"41 
Writers such as Fried42 contend that lawyer's autonomy should have a place. He asserts 
that the lawyer also has rights of choice, rights to exercise moral autonomy, and that the 
autonomy of the professional should be preserved. The provision of justice to the individual 
at the expense of the denial of it to the lawyer is seen as an unacceptable irony. Advocates 
of this view consider the freedom of the lawyer to act as "an aspect of the lawyer's free will, 
40 
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to be exercised within the realm of the lawyer's moral autonomy."43 Furthermore, it is seen 
as having equal weight to that of the client's autonomy therefore "the lawyer who is asked 
to do something personally distasteful or immoral (though perfectly legal) should be free 
either to decline to enter into the relationship ... or to terminate it".44 Such critics challenge 
the assertion that the guarantee of competent representation, and therefore the denial of 
choice, is the inevitable price to be paid for the monopoly of the right of audience in the 
courts.45 Of this 'bargain' it is asked whether it is 'fair' and even more so, 'beneficial'. 
III THE PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO REPRESENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
In the debate of whose autonomy is to have precedence the system of the USA is relevant. 
The American system reflects a concern for the autonomy of the professional that is not 
present in that of the English system or other Commonwealth countries. Therefore the 
American system can be seen as an alternative to that of the Commonwealth and as 
demanding analysis. 
A The Formal Requirements Regarding the Responsibility 
The formal requirements regarding the practitioner's duty of representation are 
contained in the American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility.46 Right 
from the outset the Code confronts the conflict of ideologies that the practitioner faces. The 
first statement of the document recognises the lawyer as a "representative of clients, an 
officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality 
of justice".47 It states that these responsibilities are "usually harmonious"48 but wisely 
continues to acknowledge that this is not always so observing that the most difficult ethical 
problems arise form conflicts between the lawyer's responsibilities to client, court, and self. 
43 M H Freedman "Personal Responsibility in a Professional System" in D Luban The Ethics of Lawyers 
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The standards and conditions to be met in terms of representation can be found in 
several places in the Code. Fundamentally, Rule 1.16(b)(3) prescribes that a lawyer should 
not represent, or should withdraw from representation if, "a client insists upon pursuing an 
objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent". Unless the representation is 
court appointed49 the practitioner is therefore given the right to be selective. Furthermore, if 
the lawyer chooses to act for the unpopular cause or client, Rule 1.2 denies the implication 
of endorsement by the practitioner. Therefore subject to limited exceptions, the American 
lawyer is given the discretion to refuse representation to the client or cause that she or he 
finds morally, politically or socially0 reprehensible. 
B The Conflict of Autonomies of the American System 
The American system's honouring of professional autonomy does not go without 
criticism, especially regarding the failure to ensure access to legal systems. The UK with its 
duty to represent claims to avoid this. Supporters of the UK approach argue that without 
such a duty "those individuals who are most in need of representation would find it 
difficult if not impossible to obtain counsel."51 In support of this allegation critics point to 
the difficulties of obtaining counsel experienced by Southern blacks accused of inter-racial 
crimes in the pre-1960's, and Communists in the 1950's. 52 The more recent movie Philadelphia 
which focuses on the refusal of the American legal profession to represent a homosexual 
lawyer in his claim of wrongful dismissal is also cited5' as a reminder that such situations 
are not only unpleasant incidents of the past, but a present problem of today. 
In an ironic twist the debate surrounding this issue returns to that of 'autonomy' but this 
time it is the client's autonomy that is seen to be restricted by the exercise of the 
practitioner's autonomy. Whilst the lawyer's "professional role mandates that he or she 
will not impose moral restraint on the client's access to the law",54 the freedom of the lawyer 
to refuse representation is seen as implementing such moral restraint. In honouring the moral 
autonomy of the professional and granting him or her the choice of representation the 
client's autonomy is said to be denied.55 Such a position does not escape rebuke, and it is 
49 Rule 1.16(c) above n 39, 48. 
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claimed that a client's autonomy should be limited by the law, not by the lawyer's morality.56 
Essentially the lawyer in exercising moral autonomy is seen to fail in his or her given role, 
and to usurp the role of the law. 
Within the adversarial system the lawyer has a set role of arguing, pleading and 
presenting the merits of [the client's] case and the demerits of the opponent's.57 When a 
practitioner's skills of advocacy are withheld because of his or her pre-judgment, then the 
lawyer is seen as falling short of professional expertise:58 
The job of the lawyer ... is not to approve or disapprove of the character of his or her client, 
the cause for which the client seeks the lawyer's assistance, or the avenues provided by the 
law to achieve that which the client wants to accomplish. The lawyer's task is, instead, to 
provide that competence which the client lacks and the lawyer, as professional, possesses. 
Furthermore, whilst failing in this legitimate role, the lawyer is accused of adopting an 
improper one. The practitioner is seen to take on the role of 'enforcement mechanism'59 and to 
unjustifiably assume the functions of the court:60 
Just imagine what would happen if lawyers were to refuse, for instance, to represent persons 
whom they thought to be guilty .... The private judgment of individual lawyers would in 
effect be substituted for the public, institutional judgment of the judge and jury. 
The lawyer who so acts is also accused of taking over the role of the legislature. It is 
alleged that if the proposed conduct were so immoral that it should not be supported, then 
more than likely it would be illegal.61 . The corollary to this is the assertion that the 
legislature has the prerogative to determine the legality, or illegality of such courses of 
action, and if it is not deemed illegal then the lawyer should not by exercising pre-judgment 
undertake, in the words of Wasserstrom a "case-by-case [sort of] legislation and 
policing".62 He proceeds to observe: 63 
56 Above n 12, 60 - 61. 
57 Above n 34, 12. 
58 Above n 34, 10. 
59 Above n 12, 74. 
60 Above n 34, 11 - 12. 
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If lawyers were to substitute their own private views of what ought to be legally permissible 
and impermissible for those of the legislature, this would constitute a surreptitious and 
undesirable shift from a democracy to an oligarchy of lawyers. 
Essentially the wrongfulness of this action lies in the practitioner usurping legislative 
power. By morally refusing to take a case or to represent the client in asserting a right 
provided by the legislature the lawyer is seen to improperly undermine the functions of both 
the legislature and the legal system which he or she is supposed to serve. 
Finally, in the recognition that as a result of exercising moral autonomy access to law is 
threatened, the morality of the refusal is questioned. It is asked whether the immorality of 
the denial of access is justified in terms of the immorality of the act or course of conduct 
which is refused, and a tension of 'moralities' evolves. 
Freedman64 discusses this by using Wasserstrom's65 example of the disinheriting parent. 
In this example the lawyer is presented with the dilemma of the client who wishes to draft a 
will disinheriting a child because the child is opposed to war in Vietnam. Wasserstrom 
implies that the lawyer ought to refuse to draft the will "because the client's reason is a 
'bad' one" .66 Yet Freedman challenges this by equating the wrongs of the client and the legal 
practitioner. He asks "is the lawyer's paternalism toward the client preferable - morally or 
otherwise- to the client's paternalism toward [his or] her children?"67 
Freedman's question, when taken at a more generalised level becomes - "which is 
preferable - the immorality of the refusal, or the immorality of the cause or the act that is 
refused?" Essentially, this is an autonomy question that asks -"which is preferable- the 
denial of the client's autonomy in order to avoid doing that which is perceived as immoral, 
or the honouring of the autonomy regardless of the perpetuation of a situation or result 
which one perceives as immoral?" Taken in a wider sense this is exactly the dilemma that 
the American practitioner faces. 
In the provision of choice, there is much latitude and uncertainty; and whilst some 
contend that a lawyer should never refuse and be instrumental to a denial of access, and 
very few submit that the lawyer should refuse without good care or reason, another faction 
argues that refusal and its inevitable denial of access is justified in certain circumstances. If 
this view is accepted, the issue is then, under what circumstances? The next section of this 
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paper will review those sets of circumstances in which refusal is seen to be justified and 
unjustified. 
C Justified or Unjustified Refusal? 
According to Schwartz the question of whether refused representation is justified or not 
is not merely a choice between 'to deny' or 'not to deny' access. Rather, he sees this 
determination as a 'balancing' exercise. For Schwartz, the decision is a complex one 
necessitating the balancing of the following three elements: 68 
the nature and substantiality of the legal interests being vindicated; 
2 the gravity of injury or damage to the party who will suffer the moral wrong; and 
3 the adequacy of presentation of the cause without counsel. 
Schwartz's elements are useful as they summarise many of the questions and concerns 
that are raised in the consideration of justified or unjustified refusal. Each of these elements 
shall be examined. 
1 The nature and substantiality of the legal interests 
This element requires an assessment of the importance of the legal right that is being 
denied. It asks whether the right is significant, and if so, that value is seen as sufficient 
justification for the subordination of the lawyer's autonomy. Fried puts the question as 
such:6 " 
... is there a moral obligation to help the finance company foreclose on the widow's 
refrigerator? If the client pursues the foreclosure in order to establish a legal right of some 
significance, I do not flinch from the conclusion that the lawyer is bound to urge this right. ... 
But if ... the case means no more to the finance company than the resale value of one more 
used refrigerator, common sense says the lawyer can say no. One should be able to distinguish 
between establishing a legal right and being a cog in a routine, repetitive business operation, 
part of which just happens to play itself out in court. 
Wolfram also contends that different claims attract different significance. He uses the 
illustrations of (a) the Nazi seeking representation against the erroneous accusation of a 
serious crime such as the self-defence murder of an anti-Nazi protester, and (b) the Nazi 
who seeks "the vindication of a right of free speech in order to be able in the future to 
68 
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spread, legally but viciously, Nazi gospel about Jews and blacks."70 Wolfram views the 
nature and significance of these claims as two very different things, regardless of the fact 
that in both cases the lawyer might wish to refuse on the ground of a strong revulsion 
against Nazism and its adherents. For Wolfram, the practitioner has a "Clayton's" choice' 
in terms of the first situation. "The unwarranted threat to the Nazi's freedom from the 
impending criminal proceeding"71 is seen as of sufficient severity of harm as to give rise to a 
duty of representation. However, he does not see that there is a duty to assist in the 
vindication of the right to free speech. He reasons that:72 
Unlike the murder situation, here the abhorrent ideology of Nazism is central to the proposed 
course of conduct. With the lawyer's assistance the ideology can be broadcast, without it, it 
will be suppressed, even if against the legal right of the Nazi to free expression. [Furthermore] 
the Nazi proposes to engage in future elective behaviour. Moreover, it is behaviour that will 
impose harm upon the targets of speech, Jews and blacks, whereas an acquittal of an unjust 
murder charge will have no "victims". 
Wolfram's example exposes the discretion involved in this assessment, for it must be 
acknowledged that contrary to Wolfram's view, others may see the consequences of refusing 
the vindication of the right to speech as of such importance and 'severity of harm' that it 
would give rise to the duty of representation. Such differences of outcome are possible and to 
be expected, for this exercise requires the assessment of the nature and importance of the 
legal interest and the weighing of it against the denial of representation. Hence, where the 
scales tip is dependent upon the weight attributed to the interest, a weight that will differ 
according to the values of the assessor. 
The first element to be applied in determining whether refusal is justified or unjustified is 
the assessment of the importance of the claim. Within certain limits of general acceptability 
and common sense the outcome of this assessment is unpredictable as it will be dependent 
upon the values of the assessor. However, the general consensus is that if the client's claim is 
found to be morally compelling then. there exists a duty to represent. Conversely, if the 
practitioner can, with all honesty and sincerity, assert that the claim fails to achieve 
sufficient standing as to warrant a duty to represent, then she or he is likely to be justified in 
refusing. 
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2 The gravity of injury 
The traditional view of the neutral and partisan lawyer legitirnises the practitioner's 
assistance in an act that is legally justified, but morally suspect, without appointing any 
responsibility for the consequences. The professional is told: 73 
What you do is not personal; it is a formal, legally-defined act. Therefore, ... a lawyer is morally 
entitled to act in this formal representative way even if the result is injustice, because the legal 
system which authorises both the injustice and the formal gesture for working it insulates [the 
lawyer] from personal moral responsibility. 
The opposite view to this attributes accountability to the lawyer and argues that the 
practitioner can, and should, refrain from using the shortcomings of the law to harm others. 
The 'gravity of injury' element positions itself within this accountability type of view of the 
lawyer's role. This element requires the balancing of the harm that will result as a 
consequence of the act, against the harm that will result as a consequence of a refusal to 
represent, and if the first outbalances the latter, then refusal is deemed to be justified. 
Schwartz says ''The greater the damage or injury that will be caused the party suffering the 
moral wrong, the lesser the interest in providing counsel to the unrepresented party whose 
legal rights will be lost" .74 
This element overtly recognises the importance of the right of the legal professional to 
exercise personal autonomy. It provides the justification for the lawyer who wishes to 
refuse a brief because it will set a precedent which she or he believes is against public 
interest and justice. This element allows a lawyer to take the Wolfram approach that the 
Nazi's freedom of speech can be overridden because of the harm that it will impose upon 
targets of the speech. Furthermore, this element allows the refusal of representation to a 
remorseless convicted murderer who seeks representation for an appeal on technical 
grounds because of the lawyer's aversion to assisting in the avoidance of deserved and 
justified penalty or sanction.75 However, within this element the right to exercise moral 
autonomy is not absolute. It is seen to be conditional upon its lesser potential to 'injure', and 
if the harm of refusal to represent is seen to be as less 'injurious', then in the conflict of the 
professional and moral obligations, moral obligation is privileged76 and refusal is justified. 
Conversely, if the harm of refusing outweighs the harm of asserting the right or claim, then 
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refused representation is deemed as unjustified, and ironically, as failing moral 
responsibility. 
3 The adequacy of presentation of the cause without counsel 
The third element founds itself upon the contention that the duty to represent is of greater 
weight than the exercise of moral autonomy in the circumstance of those who are unable to 
obtain counsel. Firstly, in acting for such clients the lawyer is seen to satisfy the 
professional obligation bestowed of accepting a "share of tendered employment which may 
be unattractive both to him [or her] and to the bar generally".77 More importantly, beyond 
this professional obligation the lawyer is seen to do 'moral good' by giving aid to the client 
in the situation of absolute necessity, and by acting in a situation when to refuse would be 
like the uncaring and nonchalant refusal to save a drowning child. Luban describes this 
situation as the 'lawyer for the damned'.78 The heroism of the rescuer is admired, he says, 
and therefore, in comparison to the severity of harm that would result if the lawyer refused 
to take the brief, the decision to act is justified. He claims "The phenomenon I am describing -
call it what you will, human sympathy, animal pity, caritas - [is admired] ... Out of this 
admiration, we freely grant that the lawyer for the damned is not her [or his] client's 
accomplice and is not responsible for the sins of her [or his] client" .79 
An important corollary of this assertion is the challenging of the allegation that the 
refusal of the practitioner means the denial of access to justice. Supporters of this view 
contend that the refusal of one lawyer does not mean that access is denied.80 The choice of 
one practitioner constitutes a refusal on his or her part, but it does not debar the client from 
pursuing alternative avenues. Rhode claims "[The lawyer's] refusal to aid certain 
endeavours will not necessarily pre-empt client choice. It may simply impose the 
psychological and financial costs of finding alternative counsel".81 Alternatively, the 
refusal means that the client is forced to represent him or herself, and whilst this gives rise 
to objections of disadvantage/2 it does not necessarily mean that access is denied."3 
77 M Davis "The Right to Refuse a Case" in Ethics and the Legal Profession above n 22,441 at 443. Note 
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Furthermore, it is argued that the refusal of one lawyer does not constitute the refusal of 
all lawyers/4 and in reality it is very unlikely that the refusal of one will mean that all 
counsel will refuse. The very complexity of the morality of the action is based upon the fact 
that there will be differing views as to whether it is right or wrong; and therefore it is very 
improbable that there will be consensus of legal practitioners as to whether it is 'right' or 
'wrong', and whether the representation should be refused or not: "As long as the legal 
profession is reasonably representative, it will not be necessary to induce competent 
lawyers to represent unpopular but decent clients."85 
4 The additional criteria of "the impact on the professional" 
In addition to Schwartz's three criterion there is another that deserves consideration in 
the determination of whether a refusal to represent a client is justified or not. Schwartz's 
criterion focus on the consequences of the choice upon the prospective client, or as felt by 
society as a whole, yet little attention is paid to the impact the determination might have 
upon the lawyer. Such a consideration is important, and if the American claim of respecting 
individual autonomy is to be accepted then factors such as 'the impact of the choice to 
represent' must be acknowledged. 
The general task of lawyering carries with it 'costs' -both personal and social,86 and 
this can certainly be said of the consequences of the choice to represent the unpopular cause. 
Essentially, the consideration of the 'costs' of representation is an assessment of how 
burdensome the acceptance of the repugnant client or the agreement to assist in the 
vindication of a distasteful cause, will be. Whilst the professional's first obligation is to 
serve, it is generally accepted that this does not require complete submission to the point of 
'martyrdom'. 
Wolfram asks the question "Would the refusal to provide legal assistance be justified 
because ... of harm that might be inflicted upon the lawyer, and the lawyer's other clients and 
family as a result of the representation?"87 In asking this question he evidences his 
acceptance of the assertion that the choice to represent inevitably subjects the professional 
to public scrutiny. Such a phenomenon is especially so when the client or cause is one of 
notoriety, and whilst in hindsight it is easy to admire the courage of the lawyer who takes 
84 SeeD Lamb "Ethical Dilemmas: What Australian Lawyers Say About Them." in Legal Ethics and 
Legal Practice : Contemporary Issues above n 18, 217, 222. Note that a discussion of the 'No 
Difference' doctrine is not included in this paper. 
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on such a cause, the difficulty of exercising that courage should not go unnoticed. As 
Wolfram notes: 88 
Professional heroes, like heroes generally are more easily remembered at a comfortable distance 
than recognised at moments of crisis and public consternation. The ... role of ... defending an 
w1popular client is often one of great tension, professional and personal isolation and 
humiliation. Often it has been accompanied by a serious decline in the lawyer's clientele and 
income. 
According to Wolfram a commonly held view is that lawyers represent objectionable 
clients either because they disregard the harm they do, solely to make money, or because they 
agree with their client's objectives.89 Under any of these formulations the practitioner faces 
a cynical portrayal of the legal role and inevitably she or he "becomes morally tainted"."0 
"A lawyer with regular clients", it is said, "takes on their reputation, no matter what the 
canons [That is, the ethical code or model rules] say"/1 and in making the choice to represent 
the repugnant client or cause the lawyer places both reputation and law practice in 
jeopardy.92 
Perhaps the truth of these statements is best evidenced in the experiences of the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). Despite the indignant disavowal of their clients' projects the 
ACLU has proceeded in the defence of "abhorrent clients with repellent projects"93 and 
suffered the consequences of the choice to proceed. The Union's most renown representation 
is its 1977 representation of the Nazi party when David Goldberger, legal director of the 
ACLU,94 appeared successfully"5 on behalf of the Nazi party in order to establish its right to 
'free speech and assemblage'.% The facts of this situation are both interesting and important. 
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The situation arose when "a small, but active group of ... [N]azis"97 sought to picket the 
village hall of the predominantly Jewish community of Skokie. Skokie at the time, had a 
population of approximately 70,000 people and more than 40,000 residents were Jewish, 
with 7000 of these having been inmates of Nazi concentration camps.98 The planned protest 
was peaceful, and Goldberger describes the intentions of the Nazi's:99 
The [N]azi group planned to assemble 30 to 50 members on the steps of the village hall .... 
They planned to picket for half an hour and carry signs protesting a prior Skokie Park District 
permit denial. The signs were to say, among other things, "Free Speech for White People." The 
demonstrators were to wear w1iforms resembling those worn by the Nazi stormtroopers during 
World War II, complete with swastika armbands. No speeches were planned. 
However, due to the deeply offensive nature of this planned action the Jewish community 
moved swiftly, and four days prior to the assembly the village obtained an injunction 
barring the uniforms, the swastika and all potentially offensive language.100 
It was at this point that Goldberger became involved. The leader of the Nazi group 
appealed to the ACLU to represent them, and Goldberger, feeling that he had no other choice 
agreed to take the brief. The consequences of fuis choice were felt by both the ACLU and 
Goldberger personally. As recounted by Goldberger:101 
The ... office was swamped with angry telephone calls, letters of resignation, ultimately some 
threats of violence. It is my understanding that some people opposing our representation 
quietly approached ACLU fw1ding sources to discourage donations and grants .... I came in for 
a substantial share of the criticism and vituperation. In one court document, I was called 
"neo-Nazi counsel" ... Personally insulting telephone calls poured into my office. When I 
appeared at speaking engagements I was repeatedly called a Nazi sympathiser or a dupe. 
Goldberger's experience is not unique. Freedman cites the example of Professor Roisman 
who had disciplinary proceedings and criminal contempt charges brought against her as a 
consequence of her involvement in representing the tenancy interests of the poor and 
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minorities.102 Furthermore, the recent example of the appointment by the ACLU of black 
lawyer, Anthony Griffin, to represent the Texas Grand Dragon of the Klu Klux Klan shows 
that public reaction has not changed since the Skokie affair. Griffin was criticised strongly 
by black groups for his action, and the Texas National Association for the Advancement of 
Coloured People demanded his resignation.103 
Goldberger does not merely recount his Skokie experience, he goes further to examine the 
significance of the reaction. In doing so, he points to the pragmatic reasons for why there is 
reluctance on the part of the bar to undertake the representation of 'the unpopular'. He 
says" [F]or many, it would harm their law practices by repelling some of their customary 
clients. Others simply avoid such cases as a matter of personal preference".104 Goldberger 
rejects this kind of reasoning. He argues that "a lawyer's quest for economic security does 
not nullify ethical obligations to assure that all in need of legal representation have access 
to it".u15 Therefore, for Goldberger, as evidenced by his stand in the Skokie affair, personal 
professional welfare is not sufficient to override professional duties. 
Others, however, disagree. In reply to his question of whether such harm might justify 
refusal Wolfram says: 106 
A desire not to ruin one's private practice or one's organisation, not to irnpatr seriously the 
extent to which one can make credible arguments on behalf of other clients, not to bring 
public scom upon one's family and friends - these and similar concems are legitimately 
compelling. And, ... they might prevent any duty to represent from arising. 
Defenders of this view argue that it is unreasonable to expect that a lawyer will 
prioritise professional duty above personal welfare. If the legal professional chooses to act 
self-sacrificially then that is an appropriate exercise of his or her autonomy, but to require 
that all practitioners will do so, is both unrealistic and improper. As Thompson states "The 
general law does not impose upon the public the requirement to jump into a swift flowing 
river to save a stranger even though it was within their capabilities. Why should a 
professional code of conduct require more of a practitioner than is ordinarily expected of 
other members of the community" .1 07 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
Above n 51, 18. 
Above n 7, 152. 
Above n 94, 48. 
Above n 94, 48. 
Above n 40, 225. 
W Thompson "Rules of Professional Conduct" (1995) NZLJ 128, 133. 
133 
134 (1998) 28 VUWLR 
An expected response to Thompson's statement is that the lawyer in jeopardising his· or 
her legal practice is not risking one's life to save a stranger and therefore this analogy is 
limited. Wolfram however, refutes any such criticism. In using the example of the captain of a 
ship he asks the same question of the duty to 'rescue' but within an economics context:108 
[W]hile morality would not require a sea captain to subject his or her own ship and crew to 
certain danger to rescue the crew of another ship, what if the time required to effect the 
rescue would merely spoil a perishable cargo? Or what if the sea captain would become 
personally liable for additional days' wages for the crew or would lose additional cargoes 
waiting in port that would go to other ships because of the delay. Most moral systems would 
conclude that, while rescue under these circumstances is morally correct, even morally heroic, 
it is not required due to the sacrifice of the rescuer's own substantial interests that would be 
involved. 
Wolfram's sea captain example reflects the concern that is often put forward of whether 
the ideal of the self-sacrificing valiant of justice corresponds with the reality of the legal 
professional's role. Pepper reminds advocates of ethics that ethical dilemmas must be 
answered within a market context, as this is the system that the contemporary legal 
practitioner functions in. 109 Critics are reminded by Wolfram that whilst much of the ideal 
of the venerable profession remains, the reality of market forces are equally pressing, and 
inevitably these must impact upon the professional's role:110 
Lawyers are not totally free agents that interact randomly with clients and third parties ... 
They often are members of law firms and in almost all cases have secretaries, paralegals, jw1ior 
lawyers, and others who are economically dependent on the lawyer to keep a steady flow of 
business coming through the office ... Lawyers have families and consequent economic and 
moral responsibilities. 
Rhode is supportive of this view. She states that it is "naive to suppose that [ethical 
decision making] remains impervious to market forces".lll She contends that such pressures 
play a dominant role in determining how a practitioner will conduct his or her practice, and 
cites an empirical study of Chicago lawyers 112 in support of her contention. 
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Hence the determination of 'justified' or not becomes more than the consideration of the 
impact of the refusal upon the 'requesting' client, or the maintenance of justice. It includes, to 
a significant extent, the assessment of the harm that the professional is likely to suffer. If the 
'harm', in terms of the professional, is seen to be of such an extent as to outweigh that of the 
other, then 'refusal' is likely to be deemed as justified. 
D Comparison 
In comparison to the cab rank rule prescribed duty of representation of the UK, the USA 
system is complex and uncertain. With the duty of the UK comes restriction, certainty and 
relative simplicity, while the American system generates greater freedom of choice, 
uncertainty and a complexity of factors that must be considered in making the justifiable 
choice. 
The jurisprudence of representation for the USA stems from a combination of ethical 
formal requirements and commentary on these by legal philosophers and lawyers. 
Fundamentally, this combination appears to say that if a lawyer's autonomy is to be 
respected, he or she cannot be told what is morally correct or incorrect, nor prohibited from 
making these decisions personally, however, she or he can be given the principles upon 
which to make such decisions and ultimately the choice is the practitioner's. 
IV THE NEW ZEALAND CONTEXT 
A The Duty in New Zealand 
The formal requirements in New Zealand regarding the duty to represent are found in the 
Rules of Professional Conduct.113 Reflecting the fundamental nature of this matter, the rule 
states:114 
A practitioner as a professional person must be available to the public and must not, without 
good cause, refuse to accept instructions for services within the practitioner's fields of practice 
from any particular client or prospective client. 
The Commentary to Rule 1.02 provides that an inability to perform instructions 
competently or to devote sufficient time to the matter is good cause for refusing to act. 
Conversely, refusal "based on the race, colour, ethnic, or national origin, sex or creed of the 
prospective client" is not. No mention is made of the repugnant client or the distasteful 
cause. 
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B The Effect of the Cab Rank Rule 
Like the UK practitioner, the legal professional of New Zealand is subject to the cab 
rank rule.115 From this it could be presumed that the New Zealand practitioner shares the 
same obligations and responsibilities as the English practitioner. Yet this is not really so, 
for whilst it is said that both are subject to the cab rank rule the practical effect of the rule 
in the two nations is very different. This is because unlike the UK, where the bar and 
solicitors are separate branches and subject to different codes of conduct, most New 
Zealand practitioners enrol as both a barrister and solicitor. Consequently he or she is 
subject to the rules applying to both branches of the profession. 116 
This is a fundamental difference in terms of cab rank rule obligations, for the role 
differentiation of the UK eases the stringency of the obligation, and for the English lawyer 
the practical outcome of the rule is not as exacting or protective as it seems. For in the UK 
the structure of the profession grants and enables choice even within the constraints of the 
cab rank rule. Of this Wolfram writes: u 7 
In the English system a client must first find a solicitor who is willing to represent the client. 
The solicitor [o]n behalf of the client must then approach a barrister's clerk, who has been 
g1ven discretion by the several barristers in the same chambers over which the clerk presides 
to accept briefs at fees which the clerk is to negotiate with solicitors. There is little professional 
control over the clerk's fee quotations. Nor is the clerk required to accept a case [ o ]n behalf of 
a barrister who is already fully committed. The cab rank rule purports to require only that an 
uncommitted barrister accept any case in which his or her clerk negotiated an appropriate fee 
with the client's solicitor. Obviously, in setting the fee, and in reporting on the state of the 
barristers availability there is adequate room for the clerk to protect barristers against 
unwanted briefs. 
Wolfram's scepticism is based upon two grounds. Firstly, that the administrative 
processes of the separated profession enable avoidance of the obligation to represent. 
Secondly, that the practical realities of legal practice provide ample opportunity for 
avoidance, and therefore in real terms the duty is no more than a theoretical ideal. Whilst 
the first of these has some significance for the New Zealand profession in terms of the 
relative lack of opportunity to elude the duty, the second of these is even more important, for 
it recognises the abundant opportunity for the evasion of the requirements of the rule. Temby 
highlights the ease of this avoidance stating that ''it is a simple matter for a barrister to 
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decline a brief if he [or she] does not want to accept."118 Disney takes the matter one step 
further by asserting that evasion is not only possible, but it is also practised, and most often 
it goes unsanctioned when he states "The cab rank rule is not infrequently evaded. Such 
evasion is difficult to detect, and even more difficult to prove with sufficient certainty to 
justify disciplinary action.119 
History shows that Wolfram's scepticism is somewhat justified. Disney cites two 197 4 
examples as evidence of this. One from the UK where "the English Bar Council had to make 
an appeal for senior counsel to represent ... IRA members charged ... with bombing the Old 
Bailey courts in London and seriously injuring a barrister and several other members of the 
legal and court fraternity." 120 The other from Australia where "a meeting of Sydney 
barristers asked their Bar Association to urge its members to accept briefs in the trials of 
prisoners arising out of a "riot" at Bathurst Gaol. Apart from the likelihood that the briefs 
would involve making serious allegations against prison officials, police and senior public 
servants, it was clear that the trials would be very long and the remuneration very low" .121 
Disney's examples point to two very clear instances of evasion. However based upon this 
and further anecdotal evidence the writer submits that such avoidance happens on a more 
regular scale, and in regards to more common causes. Furthermore that detection is not easy, 
and therefore incidents often go unchallenged and unrecorded. 
The writer suspects that a more common circumstance of refusal is that of the legally 
aided brief. It is interesting to note that prior to August 1992, Commentary (5) to the Rule 
1.02 prescribed that the "fact that a client [was] legally aided or intend[ed] to apply for 
legal aid [was] not a ground for declining to act."122 Furthermore, that the standard of 
service given a legally aided client should not differ from that given to a regular fee paying 
client. 123 It is assumed that such commentary was included out of need, and that there had 
been incidences of refusal on these prohibited grounds. The writer infers from this 
amendment that legal aid is now an acceptable reason for refusal of representation. In 
recognising the strong economic emphasis of the modem profession it is suspected that the 
regular fee paying client is likely to be more readily accepted than the legally aided client. 
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the New Zealand Law Society on 28 July 1989 (The Society, Wellington, NZ, 1990) 1.02 -1.03. 
Above n 122, Commentary (7) at 1.02- 1.03. 
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The 1992 amendment is a sad and telling indication of the ineffectuality of the cab rank 
rule. It is a sad day for justice when it can be said that a lawyer cannot refuse to represent a 
client because of the moral wrong that he or she will do in accepting the brief, but may refuse 
a client on the ground that the employment will not generate as much profit as that of other 
clients. Recognition of the immorality of this position demands change. 
V CONCLUSION 
This paper concludes that: 
• the cab rank rule does not respect the moral autonomy of the individual practitioner; 
• the cab rank rule does not guarantee access to legal processes, neither does the removal of 
the rule deny access; and 
• the interests of justice, good and professional competence are not met by requiring that a 
lawyer prioritise his or her client's needs above his or her moral autonomy. 
From this analysis of the UK and USA alternatives the writer elects the American system 
as the most favourable. Accordingly reform of the New Zealand system is advocated. It is 
submitted that whilst the professional should be reminded of the obligation to public service 
and client welfare, he or she should not labour under the duty to provide representation in 
circumstances which she or he considers adverse to public welfare, or adverse to moral 
practice. 
Furthermore, legal practice should be more than moral prostitution, and the practitioner 
should be given the right to exercise moral autonomy. If lawyers are to be expected to uphold 
tenets of justice and morality then it is submitted that the system that demands this of them 
should honour their right to abide by their own personally held tenets of justice and 
morality. If the legal system is to be respected for its integrity then it must allow its members 
to exercise integrity. Furthermore, it is submitted that in valuing moral autonomy, integrity 
and altruism, the need for a duty of representation declines, for there will always be the 
'Goldbergers' who in the tension of moralities consider it morally compelling to represent 
the immoral. 
Finally, it is submitted that the immorality of denied access is great, and in the rare case 
of absolute denied access then the profession bears the responsibility of ensuring access. 
Individual autonomy is not absolute. Like the 'pro-life' doctor who is obligated to perform 
an abortion on a life-threatened woman, so the lawyer must undertake representation in the 
crisis situation where there is no other choice. Accordingly it is submitted that a power of 
court appointment should be retained, to be used only in the most extreme of cases. 
The ethical duty of representation is essential to the legal profession, however in its 
most stringent form it fails to respect the rights of the practitioner, and generates legal 
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practice that falls short of reflecting the values and expectations of society. This failure 
justifies its reform, and accordingly reform is advocated. For it is only then that 'lawyering' 
will be the profession of honour and integrity that it professes to be; and it is only then that 
the modern lawyer will have no cause to ask "can I be a good lawyer and still be a good 
person?" 
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